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DURING  THE 1970s  there was a marked  increase  in both the turnover  and 
perceived shortages  in U.S. labor markets  that were associated with a 
given rate of unemployment.  In those years a given unemployment  rate 
became linked  with much  faster wage growth  and much  slower produc- 
tivity  growth  than  it was before.  This  paper  presents  evidence  that  relates 
the apparent  increasing  difficulty  employers  have had in satisfying  their 
labor demands at given rates of unemployment  to the U.S. record of 
wage and productivity  growth.  Throughout  the discussion  the extent of 
labor turnover (measured  in terms of discharge  and quit rates for the 
manufacturing  sector) and the degree of apparent  shortages (reflected 
primarily  in help-wanted advertising per employee) associated with 
particular  unemployment  rates  are  referred  to as labor  market  imbalance. 
In the 1970s  the average  annual  growth  rate  of the civilian  labor  force 
was much  greater  than  it was in the preceding  twenty years:  2.5 percent 
a year in the 1970s, 1.7 percent a year in the 1960s, and 1.1 percent a 
year in the 1950s.  To put the rate  for the 1970s  in better  perspective,  one 
should include in the picture  the forecasts of labor  force growth  by the 
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U.S. Bureau  of Labor Statistics for the present and next decades: 1.4 
percent  a year in the 1980s  and  0.5 percent  a year in the 1990s. 
From 1970  to 1980,  although  civilian  employment  did not grow quite 
as fast  as the labor  force, it rose by more  than  20  million.  After  controlling 
for cyclical factors with the unemployment  rate for prime-age  males 
(ages twenty-five  to fifty-four),  between the macroeconomic  watershed 
year, 1973,  and 1981  the annual  employment  growth  rate  was 75 percent 
above its post-1959  trend;  even within  the ailing  manufacturing  sector, 
after controlling  for cycle in the same way, the new hires rate was 19 
percent  above its trend  value. Also, since 1973  (without  controlling  for 
cycle or trend) the cross-state dispersion of employment growth, as 
measured  by the variance  of the distribution  of weighted employment 
growth rates that have been weighted by the state's share of national 
employment,  has been 49 percent  above its 1959-72  mean  value.  I 
Because an employer's  difficulty  in satisfying  labor  demands  is likely 
to depend  on how fast those demand  rates  are  growing,  a more  rapid  and 
uneven growth of employment should be expected to increase the 
imbalance  in individual  labor  markets.  This occurs, in part,  because it is 
harder to find applicants with the right attributes as the number of 
positions to be filled increases. In addition, the employer's discharge 
(fire)  and quit rates are likely to rise with the new hires rate. Thus the 
mean  and variance  of employers'  employment  growth  rates  are  likely to 
condition  the extent to which labor  markets  are in imbalance  and hence 
have an impact  on the correlates  of this imbalance.2 
Virtually  all studies that have tried  to explain  the disappointing  wage 
and  productivity  developments  of the 1970s  and  other  characteristics  of 
1. A related  analysis by David Lilien focuses on shifts in the locus of employment 
across industries.  Lilien does not deal with the geographic  location of the employment 
growth.  See David  M. Lilien, "Sectoral  Shifts  and  Cyclical  Unemployment,"  Journal  of 
Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (August  1982),  pp. 777-93. 
2.  For related  discussions of the operation  of labor markets  see Robert  M. Solow, 
"The Nature  and Sources of Unemployment  in the United States," International  Trade 
and Finance: A Collected  Volume of Wicksell Lectures,  1958-1964 (Stockholm: Almquist 
and  Wicksell, 1965),  pp. 251-91; Edmund  S. Phelps  and  others,  Microeconomic  Founda- 
tions of Employment  and Inflation  Theory (Norton,  1970); Charles C. Holt and others, 
"Manpower  Proposals for Phase III," BPEA, 3:1971, pp. 703-22; Robert E.  Hall, 
"Prospects  for Shifting  the Phillips  Curve through  Manpower  Policy," BPEA, 3:1971, 
pp. 659-701, and "A Theory of the Natural  Unemployment  Rate and the Duration  of 
Employment,"  Journal  of Monetary  Economics,  vol.  5 (April  1979), pp.  153-69;  and 
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the labor  market  have used aggregate  time-series  data. While  this paper 
examines  aggregate  data,  it  also analyzes  data  on  labor  market  imbalance, 
wage growth, and productivity  growth across geographic  areas. This 
permits a comparison of results based on variation in labor market 
imbalance  over time and  across areas. 
To be more  specific,  the difference  in  labor  market  imbalance  between 
the pre- and post-1973 periods resembles the difference in the 1970s 
between imbalance  in the declining  Northeast  and  Middle  Atlantic  states 
and in the booming  Southwest  and Pacific  states (see census regions  in 
appendix  A). Thus  if labor  market  imbalance  played  a role  in  the outward 
shift of  the  U.S.  Phillips curve and the downward spiral of  U.S. 
productivity  growth, wage growth  should  have been lower and produc- 
tivity growth higher  in the Northeast  and Middle  Atlantic  regions with 
low  imbalance than in the Southwest and Pacific states with high 
imbalance, once the effects of other important  factors have been re- 
moved. The sharp  increase in turnover  and apparent  shortages  in U.S. 
labor markets after 1973, and the wide differences in the degree of 
imbalance  across geographic  areas, make it possible to use both time- 
series and cross-sectional  data  to get a clear idea of the relations  among 
labor  market  conditions,  wage growth,  and  productivity  growth. 
The first  part  of this paper  presents  time-series  evidence that  strongly 
supports  the idea  that  imbalance  in U.S. labor  markets  grew  substantially 
in the 1970s,  particularly  in  a spurt  around  1973.3  Also presented  is cross- 
area  evidence of wide differences  in the degree  to which  imbalance  grew 
across regions during  that decade. Cross-area  variation  in the extent of 
labor  market  imbalance  is at the heart  of the ensuing  discussion  because 
it permits cross-area analyses of the effect of imbalance  on wage and 
productivity  growth. Although  cross-area  labor market  developments 
were not a major  cause of aggregate  changes, because more imbalance 
3. Shifts  in the Beveridge  curve  for  the United  States  are  explored  in Malcom  S. Cohen 
and  Robert  M. Solow, "The  Behavior  of Help-Wanted  Advertising,  " Review  ofEconomics 
and Statistics, vol. 49 (February  1967),  pp. 108-10;  Charles  L. Schultze,  "Has the Phillips 
Curve  Shifted?  Some  Additional  Evidence,"  BPEA,  2:1971,  pp.  452-67;  Robert  M. Solow, 
"Down the Phillips'  Curve  with  Gun  and  Camera,"  in David  A. Belsley and  others, eds., 
Inflation,  Trade  and Taxes  (Ohio  State  University  Press, 1976),  pp. 3-22; James  L. Medoff 
and Katharine  G. Abraham, "Unemployment, Unsatisfied Demand for Labor, and 
Compensation  Growth,  1956-80,"  in Martin  Neil Baily,  ed., Workers,  Jobs, and  Inflation 
(Brookings  Institution,  1982),  pp. 49-88; and Katharine  G. Abraham,  "Vacancies, Un- 
employment  and  Wage  Growth"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Harvard  University,  May 1982). 90  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
in one region  was matched  by less imbalance  in another,  the cross-area 
analysis  provides  important  insights  into the macroeconomic  relations. 
The second part  of the paper  uses both cross-area  and  aggregate  data 
to identify  the possible causes of the observed growth  in labor market 
imbalance. The principal  new finding  of this investigation  is that the 
sharp increase in the growth rate of employment at a given rate of 
unemployment  contributed  to the growth of imbalance  in U.S.  labor 
markets.4 
In the third  part  of the paper  both cross-area  and  time-series  data  are 
used to assess the effect of the growth  in labor  market  imbalance  on the 
key macroeconomic phenomena of the past decade. The evidence 
derived from these two distinct types of data implies that the spurt of 
imbalance  in U.S. labor markets  during  the 1970s  played a role in both 
the outward shift of the Phillips curve for the United States and the 
reduction  in this country's  rate  of total factor  productivity  growth. 
The last part of the paper summarizes  the primary  results about the 
degree, location, causes, and effects of labor  market  imbalance  during 
the past decade. 
Labor Market Imbalance over Time and across Areas 
In this section I describe growth  in labor  market  imbalance  by using 
Beveridge  curves, which portray  the relation  between employers'  diffi- 
culty in satisfying their labor demands (because of high turnover or 
shortages of workers with particular  qualifications)  and the degree of 
unutilized labor supply. I also present evidence on imbalance  in the 
United States as a whole and in the individual  regions. 
THE  IMBALANCE  CONCEPT 
Beveridge  curves are shown  in the diagram  below relating  employers' 
difficulty  in retaining  and hiring  the requisite  work  force, as reflected  in 
4. Although  there  have  been sizable  positive  trends  over the past  decade  in the growth 
rate  of the labor  force and  in the fraction  of the labor  force that  is female  and  aged  sixteen 
to nineteen, none of these trends exhibit what might be described as a circa-1973 
discontinuity.  Also, there is no evidence of a spurt  circa 1973  in the liberalness  of the 
unemployment  insurance  program.  For more detail on the apparent  recent growth in 
structural unemployment,  see  Economic  Report  of  the President,  February  1983, pp. 
41-49. James  L. Medoff  91 
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a job vacancy rate, V, to the relevant rate of unemployment,  U. It is 
assumed  that V is a function  of the amount  of turnover  (fires  and quits) 
and shortages per employed worker. The downward slopes of these 
curves indicate that, all else the same, the higher  (lower) is the rate of 
unemployment,  the easier (harder)  it is for employers to satisfy their 
labor demands. Beveridge curves 1 and 2 describe the relation under 
consideration  for two periods when all else was not the same. As the 
diagram  indicates, for a given U (say,  U*), employers' difficulty in 
satisfying  their labor demands  is greater  in period 2 (V2)  than it was at 
the same U in period 1 (V,). The outward  shift in the relevant  Beveridge 
curve between periods 1  and  2 indicates  that  labor  market  imbalance,  as 
defined  in this study, is greater  in period  2 than  it was in 1. 
What factors cause an outward  shift in a Beveridge curve? On the 
supply  side of the labor  market,  anything  that  makes  labor  force members 
less able or less willing to fill the existing set of jobs would lead to an 
outward  shift. Many  observers  have pointed  to the decline  in the portion 
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the outward shifts in Beveridge curves in the 1970s.5  On the demand 
side, a faster rate of employment  growth-for reasons such as substitu- 
tion away from some factor such as energy whose price suddenly 
skyrockets, a more  rapidly  changing  skill mix, or a changing  geographic 
locus of jobs-can  cause outward  shifts in the V/U curve by increasing 
job turnover  and  labor  shortages  at a given rate  of unemployment.  Thus 
faster employment  growth and, possibly, greater  variability  of growth 
rates across industries or areas could cause an outward shift in the 
Beveridge  curve.6 
IMBALANCE  SPURTS  IN  THE  1970s 
In the discussion  below, U is measured  by the unemployment  rate  of 
prime-age  males. This choice follows the Phillips  curve  literature,  which 
has moved  from  using  the total  unemployment  rate  to a rate  that  controls 
for the growing  importance  of women and young workers in the labor 
force. The Beveridge curve shifts to be documented are even more 
pronounced  if expressed in terms  of the total unemployment  rate. 
Employers'  difficulty  in satisfying  their  labor  demands, V, is proxied 
by help-wanted advertising per employee in all sectors and by the 
discharge  (fire)  and quit rates in manufacturing.  The help-wanted  index 
can be expected to reflect the difficulty  of filling  vacancies. Discharge 
and quit rates are taken as indicators of employers' ability to retain 
needed labor once secured. Although  none of these variables  is ideal, 
taken  together  they offer  a reasonable  picture  of the problems  employers 
are having  in filling  vacant  jobs and  keeping  them filled. 
Figure 1 shows the relation between the normalized  help-wanted 
index-the  Conference  Board's  index  of help-wanted  advertising  divided 
by nonagricultural  employment-and the unemployment  rate  for prime- 
age males.7 Between the end of the  1960s and the mid-1970s, this 
Beveridge  curve  shifted  outward  by a sizable  amount-a claim  supported 
econometrically  by tabular  data  below. The shift  implies  that  employers 
had to devote more resources  to meeting  their  labor  needs, presumably 
5. The origins  of this line of thought  can be traced to George L. Perry, "Changing 
Labor  Markets  and  Inflation,"  BPEA,  3:1970,  pp. 411-41. 
6. See Lilien, "Sectoral  Shifts," for a related  discussion. 
7. More  detail  on the procedure  followed  in creating  the index  can be found  in Noreen 
L.  Preston,  The Help  Wanted Index:  Technical  Descriptions  and Behavioral  Trends, 
Report  716  (New York:  Conference  Board, 1977). James  L. Medoff  93 
Figure 1.  The Normalized  Help-Wanted  Index and Unemployment,  1956-81a 
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Sources:  The  normalized help-wanted  index  is from the Conference  Board; employment  data are from the  U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  The  index  was  constructed  by  taking  the  average  of  the  monthly  help-wanted  index  figures for  each  year 
(1967  =  100) and dividing by the number of employees  on nonagricultural payrolls (in millions). 
because of a greater  inability  to attract  certain  kinds  of labor  or because 
of greater  rates  of employee turnover. 
Some have argued  that trends in the normalized  help-wanted  index 
are distorted  by developments  such as a declining  relative  cost of help- 
wanted  advertising,  the growth  of advertising  in certain  newspapers  in 
the index because of the closing of other papers, an increase in the 
importance  of occupations  that rely relatively heavily on help-wanted 
advertising,  or an increase  in affirmative  action  pressure  to advertisejob 
openings. Below I report  on cross-sectional  results based on the help- 
wanted index that support  the aggregate  time-series  evidence of figure 
1. In addition,  the data on discharges  and quits, shown in figures  2 and 94  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Figure 2.  The Discharge  Rate and Unemployment,  1959-81 
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Source:  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
3, are consistent with the type of shift indicated  by the aggregate  help- 
wanted  data. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics gathered data on the turnover in 
manufacturing  industries  until  December 1981.  The BLS collected, but 
never  published,  information  on discharges,  defined  as "terminations  of 
employment  initiated  by the employer  for such  reasons  as incompetence, 
violation of rules, dishonesty, laziness, absenteeism, insubordination, 
failure  to pass probationary  period,  etc.' '8 Figure  2 displays  the relation 
between these discharge  rates in manufacturing  for 1959-81 (the only 
years for which discharge  rates were available)  and the unemployment 
rate  for prime-age  males in the economy as a whole. The figure  reveals 
8. U.S. BureauofLaborStatistics,HandbookofMethods,  Bulletin  l910(Government 
Printing Office, 1976), p. 44. James  L. Medoff  95 
Figure 3.  The Quit Rate and Unemployment,  1958-81 
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Source: Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. 
a sharp  outward  shift in this Beveridge curve between 1969  and 1973; 
for a given rate  of unemployment  of prime-age  males  the discharge  rate, 
and  presumably  associated  costs, were substantially  higher  by 1973  than 
they had  been until 1969. 
Quit  rates  provide  another  indicator  of the difficulty  employers  in the 
manufacturing  sector have in retaining  workers; these were derived 
by the BLS in the same survey of turnover  that produced  the discharge 
rates. Figure  3 presents Beveridge  curves for the relation  between quit 
rates and the unemployment  rate of prime-age  males for 1958-81. This 
figure, like the preceding one,  implies that employers' difficulty in 
retaining  a work force at a given rate of unemployment  grew sharply 
between 1969  and 1973. 96  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 1.  Labor Market Imbalance at the Beginning and End of the 1970s, 
by Regiona 
Percent unless  otherwise  specified 
Middle 
Period and measure  Northeast  Atlantic  Southeast  Midwest  Pacific  Southwest 
1970-72 
Estimated  job vacancy 
rate, Vproxyb  0.7  0.6  0.9  0.4  0.5  0.7 
Regional  unemployment 
rate, U  5.8  4.2  4.3  4.5  7.2  4.3 
Product  of V proxy 
and U  4.1  2.5  3.9  1.8  3.6  3.0 
1977 
Fraction  of employers 
reporting  shortages, 
V proxy  0.52  0.53  0.48  0.57  0.61  0.78 
Regional  unemployment 
rate, U  8.7  7.3  5.9  4.7  9.4  6.5 
Product  of V proxy 
and U  4.5  3.9  2.8  2.7  5.7  5.1 
Sources:  Job vacancy  rates  are from U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  Employment  and Earnings,  vol.  19 (May 
1973), p.  146; regional unemployment  rates for  1970-72  are estimated  with data on individuals from BLS,  Cuirrent 
Population  Surveys; unemployment  rates and fraction of employers  reporting shortages in a 1977 survey of employers 
in the manufacturing sector  are from Daniel  D.  Cook  and John S.  McClenahan,  "Skill  Shortage,"  Industry Week, 
vol.  194 (August 29,  1977), pp.  39-48. 
a.  The states  in each  region are listed  in appendix  A. 
b.  Rates  for 77 SMSAs  were  weighted  by employment  in the manufacturing sector  (see  appendix  C for a list of 
SMSAs). 
CHANGING  LABOR  MARKET  CONDITIONS  ACROSS  AREAS 
Table 1 provides indicators  of labor  market  conditions  for manufac- 
turing  in the six geographic  census regions at the beginning  and end of 
the 1970s.  It suggests  that  the largest  increases  in  labor  market  imbalance 
during  the 1970s  occurred  in the Southwest  and, to a lesser extent, in the 
Pacific  states. 
The top half of the table uses data on the job vacancies collected by 
the BLS from 1969 to  1973 in its survey on job openings and labor 
turnover.  Annual  averages  of monthly  vacancy rates  were derived  from 
these data  for selected standard  metropolitan  statistical  areas (SMSAs) 
and  were published  in  Employment  and  Earnings.  These published  rates 
were used to generate  the 1970-72  weighted  average  job vacancy rates 
(by total employment)  for each region, which are presented  in the first 
row. The second row gives unemployment  rates  derived  from  the 1970- 
72 May Current Population  Survey. The product of each area's vacancy James L. Medoff  97 
rate proxy, V, and its unemployment  rate, U, for this period  is given in 
the third  row; this product  gives an estimate  of the position  of the area's 
Beveridge curve. Assuming these measures are comparable across 
regions, the data  imply  that, at the start  of the 1970s,  the Southwest  and 
Pacific  were in the middle  of the six regions  arranged  by their  extent of 
labor  market  imbalance. 
The job vacancy statistics are not available  for years after 1973. In 
their absence, the bottom half of the table presents data based on a 
survey of employers  concerning  labor  shortages  conducted  by Industry 
Week magazine  in 1977.  The fourth  row presents  the fraction  of employ- 
ers in 1977 in each region reporting  shortages in the Industry  Week 
survey  as a proxy  for V;  the fifth  row, each  region  '  s rate  of unemployment 
in that year;  and the last row, the product  of the V proxy and U. By this 
measure, labor market imbalance in the Southwest and, to a lesser 
extent, in the Pacific  states appears  to have become substantially  greater 
than  in the rest of the United States by 1977. 
The changes by region indicated by the V proxies of table 1 are 
supported  by the available help-wanted  advertising  indexes for states 
derived  from  information  published  by the Conference  Board. Because 
each state'  s level of help-wanted  advertising  depends  on the newspapers 
the Conference  Board  selected, the state indexes cannot  capture  cross- 
area differences in V. However, under reasonable assumptions, the 
percentage  changes in these indexes can be used to estimate  cross-area 
differences  in the percentage  growth  of V. 
The model designed to capture regional  percentage  growth rates in 
the normalized  help-wanted  index takes, as the dependent  variable,  the 
ratio  of the help-wanted  index to total employment  divided  by the same 
ratio for 1973  for each of twenty-five states in each year from 1970  to 
1980.  The independent  variables  are twenty-five  state dummy  variables 
that reflect the number  of states with SMSA help-wanted  advertising 
data  and  interactions  between a simple  time trend  and  dummy  variables 
for the six census regions. The model was fit using weighted (by 
employment)  least squares. 
The percentage  growth  rates of the normalized  help-wanted  index in 
each region are presented in the first column of table 2 (with standard 
errors  in parentheses  here  and  throughout  this  paper).  During  this  period 
the normalized  help-wanted  index grew at 6.2 percent  and  4.9 percent  a 98  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table  2.  Regional  Growth  in Normalized  Help-Wanted  Index  and Change  in the  V 
Ranking  of Table  1 during  the  1970s 
Annual  percentage 
change in 
normalized  V  rankingb 
help-wanted  index,a 
Region  1970-80  Early 1970s  Late 1970s  Change 
Northeast  -  1.3  2.5  5.0  2.5 
(0.8) 
Middle Atlantic  -  3.4  4.0  4.0  0.0 
(1. 1) 
Southeast  -1.1  1.0  6.0  5.0 
(1. 1) 
Midwest  1.2  6.0  3.0  -3.0 
(0.6) 
Pacific  4.9  5.0  2.0  -  3.0 
(0.7) 
Southwest  6.2  2.5  1.0  -1.5 
(1.0) 
Source:  The data used for estimates  of the percentage  change in the normalized help-wanted index were provided 
by  the  Conference  Board.  For  a discussion  of  the  help-wanted  index  see  Noreen  L.  Preston,  The Help  Wanted 
Index: Technical Description  and Behavioral  Trends, Report 716 (New  York: Conference  Board,  1977). 
a.  Estimated  percentage  changes  are based  on a weighted  (by employment)  least  squares  regression  of the help- 
wanted  index  divided  by  total  employment  in a given  state  in a given  year divided  by  the  same  ratio in  1973 on 
twenty-five  state  dummy  variables  and  the  interaction  of  a  time  trend  with  six  regional  dummy  variables;  the 
estimated  coefficients  of the interaction between  time and region were divided by the area means of the dependent 
variable and multiplied by  100 to generate percentage changes.  The sample size was 275. The numbers in parentheses 
are standard errors. 
b.  Ranking order from table  1. The highest ranking is  1; the lowest,  6. 
year  in the Southwest  and Pacific  regions,  respectively;  it declined  at an 
annual  rate  of 3.4 percent  in the Middle  Atlantic  states.9 
The last three columns of table 2 provide  evidence on the change in 
the V ranking  of each region  from  the early  to the late 1970s  based  on the 
third  and sixth rows of table 1. The apparent  direction  of this change is 
much  the same with either  the V  proxies  of table 1  or the 1970-80  growth 
rate of the normalized  help-wanted  index in the regions. One can infer 
from  this that  both  the table 1  proxies  and  the help-wanted  index  provide 
useful information  about the relative behavior of "true" V across re- 
gions. In sum, tables 1 and  2 show that  something  happened  in the 1970s 
9. Estimates  for 1960-70  indicate  that  results  for the 1970s  were not the continuation 
of trends that could be discerned in the previous ten years. For 1960-70 the annual 
percentage  changes comparable  to those presented  in table 2 are Northeast, 2.2 (0.5); 
Middle  Atlantic,  6.0 (0.8); Southeast,  5.8 (1.2);  Midwest,  4.7 (0.5);  Pacific,  3.3 (0.8);  and 
Southwest,  8.1 (1.7). James L. Medoff  99 
that caused V and V  U to grow much more in some regions of the 
United States than  in others. 
The Determinants of Growth in Labor Market Imbalance 
The next task  is to investigate  why labor  market  imbalance  grew  when 
and where it did. As stated earlier, it is very likely that the difficulty 
employers face in meeting  their labor  demands  will increase the faster 
their  demands  grow. With  rapid  growth,  it will  be more  difficult  to satisfy 
skill requirements  as the old sources of labor  supply  become inadequate 
to fully keep up with the new demand.  In addition,  employers  with high 
employment  growth  rates  are likely to confront  high  rates  of turnover  as 
high  rates  of new hires  are  accompanied  by high  discharge  and  quit  rates. 
The discharge  rate will be high because many workers  will be passing 
through  an  explicit  or implicit  probationary  period,  and  because  employ- 
ers will hire with less care when struggling  to expand their work force 
rapidly.  The quit  rate  will  be high  because  the quit  probability  is generally 
greatest  among  employees with short  job tenure. 
THE  CHANGING  REGIONAL  LOCUS  OF  EMPLOYMENT 
Table 3 presents annual  percentage  growth  rates of employment  for 
U.S. regions  in the 1950s,  1960s,  and 1970s;  it also presents  each region's 
share of national  employment at the beginning  of these decades. The 
most striking  fact in this table is the very fast rate of growth in the 
Southwest  during  the 1970s  (5.0 percent  a year);  during  this decade the 
share of national employment in the Southwest rose from 7.2 to 9.1 
percent.  The only two regions  in which  employment  growth  accelerated 
in the 1970s  were the Pacific  and Southwest, the same two regions  that 
showed the highest  imbalance  growth  in table  2 as measured  either  with 
the vacancy proxies or the change  in the help-wanted  index. 
The relation  between the difficulty  employers  have in satisfying  their 
labor  demands  and the level and  change  in the growth  rate  of their  work 
forces can be addressed  by assuming  that the percentage  change in the 
normalized  help-wanted  index is a good surrogate  for the percentage 
change  in the  job vacancy rate. Making  this assumption,  I used 1961-80 
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Table 3.  Changing Regional Distribution  of U.S. Employment, 1951-80 
Percent 
Measure  and period  Middle 
or year  Northeast  Atlantic  Southeast  Midwest  Pacific  Southwvest 
Annual  growth  in 
nonagricultural 
employment 
1951-60  0.7  0.5  2.5  0.9  3.6  2.8 
1960-70  1.7  2.5  3.9  2.4  3.5  3.8 
1970-80  0.8  1.7  3.7  2.1  3.7  5.0 
Regional  shares  of 
nonagricultural 
employment 
1951  19.6  16.8  12.6  35.3  10.0  5.8 
1960  18.5  15.4  13.8  33.7  12.1  6.5 
1970  16.7  15.1  15.4  32.7  13.0  7.2 
1980  14.1  13.9  17.2  31.3  14.5  9.1 
Source:  Employment  and  Training Report  of the President,  1981, table  D-1. 
exist to fit a weighted (with employment)  regression  of the growth  rate 
of the normalized  help-wanted  index, AHIH;  on employment  growth, 
AE/E; the change in employment  growth, A(AE/E); a time trend (T =  1, 
... .  23); and twenty-five  state dummy  variables  shown in a vector, S). 
The results of this analysis are 
(1)  AHIH =  3.80AE/E  +  3.22A(AEIE) -  0.002T  +  dS,  N  =  500, 
(0.24)  (0.20)  (0.001) 
where the mean and standard  deviation of AHIH  are 0.028 and 0.185, 
respectively;  the mean  and standard  deviation  of AlE/E,  0.029  and  0.025; 
and  of A(AE/E),  - 0.0007  and 0.027. 
Thus the percentage  growth rate of employment  and the change in 
this growth rate both appear  to have significant  and sizable effects on 
the difficulty  employers  have in satisfying  their  labor  demands. 
WHY  THE  AGGREGATE  BEVERIDGE  CURVE  HAS  SHIFTED 
The importance  of employment growth as a determinant  of labor 
market  imbalance  can also be gauged  with aggregate  data. If employer 
i's difficulty  in satisfying  labor demand  is denoted by Di and employer 
i's employment  growth  by Gi,  then it is reasonable  to assume that James L. Medoff  101 
(2)  Di  =a  +  bGi +  cGi. 
For the purpose of discussion, I take the expectation of equation 1, 
which yields 
(3)  D=a  + bG +  c(U2  +  G2), 
where D is the mean level of difficulty  and G and uG are the mean and 
variance, respectively, of employment  growth across employers; and 
the expression  (r2  +  G2) is the second moment of the G distribution. 
The relation in equation 3 was used, together with some widely 
discussed  supply-side  factors  and  cyclical  and  trend  variables,  in  explain- 
ing the aggregate  help-wanted  index. The basic equation  estimated  was 
(4)  H = a + bU  + cT + dD73 + eX, 
where  H is the normalized  help-wanted  index, as defined  above; U is the 
unemployment  rate for prime-age  males; T is a time trend  (T =  1, .  .  .. 
23);  D73  is a dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the year is 1973  or later 
(yes =  1);  and  X is a vector of potential  determinants  of imbalance:  the 
weighted  mean and weighted second moment  (sum of the variance  and 
mean squared)  of employment  growth rates across states and across 
30 one- and two-digit  (SIC)  industries  (with  employment  shares  used as 
weights), the percent  of the labor  force that is female, the percent aged 
sixteen to nineteen, the percent over age fifty-four,  and the percent of 
employment  covered  by unemployment  insurance. 
Equation  4-1 in table  4 includes  none of the elements of the X vector. 
It reveals that, starting  in 1973, the trend-corrected  normalized  help- 
wanted index has shifted upward  by an average  of 13 percent-(0. 163/ 
1.29)*  100-for any  level of the prime-age  male  unemployment  rate  (with 
the figure  1.29  being  the mean  of H in the 1959-72  period).  That  is, since 
1973, labor market imbalance, as defined here, has been 13 percent 
higher  than  what  would  have been expected given previous  trends. 
Equation  4-2 is the same as 4-1, except that it includes the weighted 
mean  and weighted  second moment  of employment  growth  rates across 
states. The addition  of these two variables  accounts  for 39 percent  of the 
growth in the normalized  help-wanted  index; it reduces the estimated 
coefficient  of the dummy  denoting  1973  or later  from  0.163 to 0.100. 
To gain  some  understanding  of the  relative  importance  of the weighted 
mean and weighted  variance  of the state employment  growth  figures,  I .t  t  o  t  o  "It  C)  C:  en 
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fit equations  containing  permutations  of the mean, mean squared,  and 
variance  of the state  employment  growth  rate.  The  estimated  coefficients 
from these regressions  imply that the geographic  variability  in growth 
rates had only a minute effect on the national level of labor market 
imbalance.  This is most likely because the high imbalance  in regions 
with rapid  employment  growth  was approximately  cancelled  out by the 
low imbalance  in regions  with slow growth. 
Equation  4-3 drops the two cross-state summary  statistics and adds 
comparable  variables  derived  from  employment  growth  in one- and  two- 
digit  SIC  industries.  10The  results  are  similar;  the  cross-industry  variables 
reduce the estimated coefficient on the dummy  for 1973  or later from 
0.163  to 0.075. As was the case for the cross-state  variables,  the mean  of 
the growth rates of employment  across industries  appears  to be much 
more  important  than  the variance  in these rates. 
The moments of the cross-state and cross-industry  distributions  of 
employment  growth  rates are highly  correlated.  Hence, even if growth 
in only one set caused increased  imbalance,  growth  in either set might 
appear  to have done so when the statistics  are examined  independently. 
When  equation  4-4 includes  both first  and second moments  of the cross- 
state and cross-industry  data, it explains roughly  the same amount of 
the imbalance spurt around 1973 as does equation 4-3. But now the 
distribution  of employment  growth  rates across industries  has no effect 
whatsoever  on the normalized  help-wanted  index. 
Equation  4-5 in table 4 includes other elements of the X vector-the 
percent of employment  covered by unemployment  insurance,  the per- 
cent of the  labor  force  that  is female,  the  percent  aged  sixteen  to nineteen, 
and the percent over age fifty-four. These variables permit one to 
ascertain, albeit crudely, whether  the effect of employment  growth  on 
labor  is likely to be due primarily  to the omission  of variables  describing 
the characteristics  of the work  force. The  estimated  effect  of employment 
growth  in equation  4-5 is reduced  to some extent by the inclusion  of the 
controls, but remains sizable. Coefficients with expected signs were 
10. Unbroken  time series from 1959  to 1981  could be obtained  for 30 one- and two- 
digit SIC industries  from the "790" data series of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics;  these 
industries  covered  all employment  in the private  sector. Comparable  variables  could  also 
be derived  with  information  for  91 three-digit  SIC  industries.  The  choice  between  summary 
statistics  based  on the more  detailed,  but less inclusive,  three-digit  industry  series or the 
less detailed,  but  fully  inclusive,  one- and  two-digit  series  did  not have a qualitative  effect 
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obtained  on all supply  variables  with the exception of the proportion  of 
the labor force aged sixteen to  nineteen. However, the estimated 
coefficient  on this variable  is insignificant  and its negative sign may be 
an indication  that  youths  are in the types ofjobs for which  employers  do 
not advertise  heavily. Finally,  results  from  equation  4-5 strongly  suggest 
that  the history  of labor  market  imbalance  over the entire 1959-81  period 
has to do with much  more  than  the history  of employment  growth. 
Shedding a Micro Light on Macro Findings 
What  happened  to wage growth  and total factor  productivity  growth 
in the 1970s across U.S.  regions? Did the regions with greater labor 
market  imbalance  experience  higher  growth  in wages and lower growth 
in productivity?  Can the cross-regional  findings  contribute  to a better 
understanding  of the comparable  aggregate  relations? 
WAGE  GROWTH  ACROSS  REGIONS  IN  THE  1960S  AND  1970s 
Wage measures  for different  regions  were developed to help answer 
some of these questions. Average hourly or weekly pay for men and 
women in detailed occupational categories (appendix B) in selected 
SMSAs (appendix  C) were taken from the BLS area wage surveys for 
1960,  1970,  and 1980.  The detailed  occupational  categories  were  grouped 
by the BLS into two large categories, "Maintenance,  Tool Room, and 
Power Plant Jobs" and "Office and Clerical  Jobs." To develop wage 
indexes corrected for variation in occupational mix, the area wage 
survey  data  were fitted  to equations  of the form 
(5)  AW=  bR +  cO, 
where  A  W =  decadal  percentage  change in wages in a detailed  occu- 
pational  category  in a given SMSA 
R  =  vector of six regional dummies 
0  =  vector of occupation  dummies  (ranging  from 14  to 30). 
The  estimated  values  of the b vector  in  different  analyses  are  presented 
in table 5. If labor market  imbalance  affects wage growth, one would 
expect to find  a noticeable  difference  in the growth  of wages in the 1  970s James  L. Medoff  105 
Table 5.  Regional Growth of Average Hourly or Weekly Pay, 
1%0-70 and 1970480a 
Decadal  percentage  change 
Period  and  job  Middle 
classification  Northeast  Atlantic  Southeast  Midwvest  Pacific  Southwvest 
1960-70 
Maintenance,  tool room, 
and power  plant  jobsb 
All  55.9  53.7  70.4  59.2  56.6  56.3 
(2.4)  (2.4)  (2.2)  (2.1)  (2.7)  (2.6) 
Male  56.4  54.5  70.0  59.3  57.5  55.9 
(2.3)  (2.3)  (2.1)  (2.1)  (2.6)  (2.5) 
Office and clerical jobsc 
All  49.9  43.6  53.1  43.8  40.6  44.0 
(2.9)  (2.9)  (2.7)  (2.6)  (3.3)  (3.1) 
Female  49.0  42.8  52.2  42.4  40.6  43.2 
(3.1)  (3.0)  (2.8)  (2.7)  (3.5)  (3.3) 
1970-S0 
Maintenance,  tool room, 
and power  plant  jobsb 
All  125.0  127.1  129.0  134.1  133.5  134.9 
(4.5)  (4.5)  (4.2)  (3.9)  (4.9)  (4.9) 
Male  123.4  126.9  129.2  133.2  133.4  134.5 
(4.5)  (4.5)  (4.2)  (3.9)  (4.9)  (4.9) 
Office and clerical jobsc 
All  103.5  110.7  119.8  115.0  121.8  124.0 
(5.6)  (5.4)  (5.3)  (4.9)  (6.1)  (6.0) 
Female  102.6  107.0  118.0  114.3  117.0  120.8 
(5.4)  (5.2)  (5.0)  (4.7)  (6.0)  (5.8) 
Source: Based  on work  in process  by the author  and Linda  A. Bell. Data  used to derive  the table's  estimates  are 
from  the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  "Area  Wage  Survey."  Bulletins  are  published  annually  for selected  metropolitan 
areas.  The  occupational  groupings  are those adopted  by the BLS for this survey;  these groups  are  described  in BLS, 
Area Wage  Surveys:  Selected Metropolitan  Areas, 1981,  3010-72  (BLS, 1982),  appendix  B. See respective  issues 
for the occupational  groups  in specific  years. 
a. Sample  sizes are as follows for both periods:  maintenance,  tool room, and power plant  jobs, 1,170;  of this, 
1,111  were male;  office  and  clerical  jobs, 539;  of this, 453 were  female.  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard  errors. 
b. Estimates  of hourly  or weekly pay are based on a model  that includes  occupation  dummies  (twenty-eight  in 
the regression  for males,  thirty  in the regression  for all), twenty-two  dummies  for the beginning  and  ending  months 
in which  a state's survey  was administered,  and six regional  dummies.  The sample  is constrained  to be the same  in 
both  periods. 
c. Estimates  for hourly  or weekly pay are based on a model  that includes  occupation  dummies  (fourteen  in the 
regression  for females, twenty-one  in the regression  for all), twenty-two  dummies  for the beginning  and ending 
months  in which  a state's survey  was administered,  and six regional  dummies.  The sample  is constrained  to be the 
same  in both  periods. 
between the high-imbalance  (Southwest  and  Pacific)  and  low-imbalance 
(Northeast  and Middle  Atlantic)  regions. However, one would expect 
much  smaller  differences  in  wage  growth  across  these four  regions  during 
the 1960s  because there were much smaller  differences  among  them in 
labor  market  imbalance  during  that  decade. 
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the 1970-80  period  wages rose more  in the Southwest  and  Pacific  states 
than in the Northeast and Middle  Atlantic  states. The 1970-80 pattern 
of wage  behavior  is not found  in the 1960-70  period  when the Southwest 
and Pacific regions were right in the middle of the extremes of the 
imbalance  spectrum.  In an average  year during  the 1970s,  these cross- 
area differences  in wage growth  were not minute;  wages of blue-collar 
workers  grew  from  0.3 to 0.5 percentage  point  faster,  and  wages  of clerical 
employees grew from 0.6 to 1.0 percentage  point faster, in the regions 
with high  imbalance  than  in the ones with low imbalance. 
The data in tables 1 and 5 can be used to fit the following model to 
give cross-sectional  estimates of the relative importance  of vacancies, 
shortages,  and  unemployment  for wage growth: 
(6)  AW = a +  bV +  cU  +  dO, 
where AW  and V are as defined  above; U is a regional  unemployment 
rate; and 0  is a dummy  indicating  the broad  occupational  grouping  of 
concern. (For 0 note that  only the rows labeled "All" in table 5 and  not 
those headed "Male" or "Female" are used in the analysis.) 
The results of this estimation  for the 1960-70 period, for which VJ 
denotes  job vacancy rate  in manufacturing  (mean,  0.63; standard  devia- 
tion, 0.17), and U is the first  regional  unemployment  rate given in table 
1 (mean, 5.0; standard  deviation, 1.2), are 
(7)  AW =  35.2  +  20.1VJ -  0.43U  +  12.90,  N  =  12;R2  =  0.81, 
(9.1)  (8.2)  (1.18)  (2.5) 
where the mean of AW  is 52.3 and the standard  deviation, 8.4. For the 
1970-80  period,  for  which Vs  denotes  percent  of manufacturers  reporting 
skill  shortage  (mean,  58.2;  standard  deviation, 10.2),  and Uis the second 
regional  unemployment  rate in table 1 (mean, 7.0; standard  deviation, 
1.6), the results  are 
(8)  AW =  101.4 +  0.35Vs  -  0.84U  +  14.80,  N  =  12;R2  =  0.79, 
(11.5)  (0.16)  (0.94)  (3.0) 
where the mean  of AWis 123.2  and  the standard  deviation,  9.7. 
Thus the cross-regional  V, U, and AW  data strongly  imply that the 
key information  coming from a labor market about the likely wage 
pressure is  the degree to which employers are having difficulty in 
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is correlated with employers' difficulty  in fulfilling  their labor needs, 
unemployment  will be related  to wage growth.  But to the extent that  the 
unemployment  rate varies independently  of the employers'  difficulty  in 
obtaining  the labor  they desire, it is unlikely  to have a meaningful  effect 
on the wage-adjustment  process. To predict wage growth, it appears 
that the analyst will do much better knowing about employers rather 
than  about  the unemployed. 
To say that vacancies matter more than unemployment  for wage 
growth  is not to say that  wage growth  is very responsive  to V;  in fact, it 
is not. In equations 7 and 8 the elasticities of AW with respect to V 
calculated  at the means  are  0.17 and  0.24, respectively.  These estimates 
may be biased downward  due to measurement  errors  in the V proxies. 
However, the cross-area  findings  imply that wage growth is not very 
responsive  to labor  market  imbalance,  even when allowing  for a sizable 
bias  and  when viewing  the imbalance  from  the perspective  of employers. 
The requisite  time-series  data are not available  for determining  the 
change in the V proxies used in equations  7 and 8 at a given U before 
and after 1973. However, one can derive a rough estimate of the 
percentage  change in V from an analysis of the aggregate  normalized 
help-wanted  advertising  index  used in  table  4. To do this, I fit  a regression 
with data for the 1959-81 period of H on a constant; on a dummy  for 
1973  or later, D73; and on the unemployment  rate  for prime-age  males. 
From  this I obtained  an estimated  coefficient  and standard  error  of D73 
equal to 0.29 and 0.08. Given that the mean value of H during  1959-72 
was 1.29,  this regression  implies  that  the percentage  change  for 1973  and 
later  was 22 percent-(0.29/1.29)  100. 
This crude estimate of the percentage  change in V implies a 4 to 5 
percent increase in the AW associated with a given U for prime-age 
males from 1973  on. Although  I believe the estimate is likely to be a 
lower bound, it does underscore  a key conclusion of this study: even 
large  increases  in labor  market  imbalance  are  likely  to have small  effects 
on A  W  because the elasticity  of the wage growth  imbalance  is small. 
Does the percentage  change  in the normalized  help-wanted  index  give 
a reasonable approximation  to the percentage  change in the vacancy 
rate? Are the percentage  changes in this index significantly  related to 
changes in the rate of wage growth?  To address these queries, I did a 
cross-sectional  analysis  using  data  on wages  and  help-wanted  advertising 
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regressed on 0  and the percentage  difference  in the mean normalized 
help-wanted  indexes  for 1970-80  and 1960-70  (AvHIH,  where  A indicates 
the 1970s value minus the 1960s value). The results of this analysis 
were 
(9)  zA(AW)  =  0.46  +  0.l9AvHIH +  0.10,  N  =  50;  R2 =  0.24, 
(0.03)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
where  the mean  of zA(z  W)  is 0.53, standard  deviation,  0.16; and  the mean 
of AvHIH  is 0.10, standard  deviation, 0.27. The coefficients estimated 
cross-sectionally  in  equation  9 imply  that  a 22  percent  change  in  aggregate 
H would be associated with an increase  of 8 percent-(0.22  0.19/0.53) 
*  100-in  the wage growth  for the nation.  I next compare  this prediction 
based on cross-sectional parameter  estimates with the macro wage- 
growth  evidence. 
CONSISTENCY  WITH  MACROECONOMIC  EVIDENCE  ON 
WAGE  GROWTH 
To conduct  a macroeconomic  time-series  analysis  of why the Phillips 
curve for the United States from 1973  to 1981  was outside the curve for 
the  preceding  twenty-five  years,  I estimated  modified-augmented  Phillips 
models using  the basic equation,  "I 
(10)  w =  a +  bT+  cD73 +  d  +  eipi  +  fH, 
where  w =  percentage  change  in average  hourly  compensation 
T =  time trend  (T =  1, . . ., 92) 
U =  unemployment  rate  for prime-age  males 
pi =  percentage  change in the GNP price deflator  in quarter  i 
(four  or sixteen lagged  values used in the estimation). 
In some analyses, V is excluded from equation 10; in others, it is 
included. As this variable is added into the regression equation, the 
estimated coefficient on the dummy  for 1973  or later reveals the likely 
effect of growth  in labor  market  imbalance  on the recent outward  shift 
in the expected-inflation  augmented  Phillips  curve. 
The augmented Phillips curve equation with four lagged inflation 
terms presented  in equation  6-1 of table 6 implies  that the curve for the 
11. For a related  investigation  see Medoffand  Abraham,  "Unemployment." 110  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1983 
periodfrom  1973:1  onwardlies36percent-(0.0185/0.051)  100-outside 
the curve for the pre-1973:1  period (where 0.051 is the mean of w for 
1956:1  to 1972:4).  The comparable  equation  with sixteen lagged  inflation 
terms, presented in equation  6-3, reveals an augmented  Phillips  curve 
after 1973:1  that has an intercept 34 percent-(0.0172/0.051)  100- 
greater  than  the pre-1973:  1 curve.  12 
How does one account  for these large  shifts in the Phillips  curve that 
cannot be explained  by factors related  to the pattern  of inflation  in the 
past?'3  Equations  6-2 and  6-4 include  the normalized  help-wanted  index 
in addition  to the variables  in equations  6-1 and 6-3. When  this variable 
is included,  the point  estimates  of the outward  shift  of the Phillips  curve 
in 1973  decrease by about 0.55 percentage  point, or about 30 percent, 
regardless of the lags used on inflation-[(1.850  -  1.301)/1.850]  100 = 
30 with four lagged inflation terms and [(1.724 -  1.155)/1.724]  100 = 33 
with sixteen.  14 
The shift  of 0.163  points, or 13  percent,  in the Beveridge  curve  for the 
relation  between the help-wanted  index and  unemployment  was associ- 
ated with an upward  shift in the Phillips  curve, indicating  a 0.4 to 0.5 
percentage  point increase in wage inflation-0. 163  . (help-wanted  coef- 
ficient  of 0.022 or 0.032) 100-in  the 1973-81  period.  Allowing  for price- 
12. The results presented  in table 6 are consistent with earlier  findings  reported  by 
Martin  Neil Baily and  James  Tobin.  They estimated  several  equations  for aggregate  wage 
growth using quarterly  data for 1958:1  through 1976:4  that included both an inverse 
unemployment  rate variable  and the help-wanted  index deflated  by total employment; 
their  model specification  is otherwise  different  from  mine, but they also generally  obtain 
insignificant  wrong-signed  unemployment  coefficients  and significant  right-signed  help- 
wanted  index  coefficients.  Baily  and  Tobin  also  present  wage-growth  equations  for  different 
sectors  of the economy;  these  findings  are  not  relevant  for  the  present  discussion,  however, 
since information  on help-wanted  advertising  does not exist at the sectoral level. See 
their "Macroeconomic  Effects of Selective Public  Employment  and Wage Subsidies," 
BPEA, 2:1977, pp. 511-41. 
13. Instability  in the Phillips  curve may take the form of shifts in the intercept  or 
changes  in the slope. Here I consider  shifts  in the intercept.  For analyses  suggesting  that 
the Phillips  curve for the United States has been much  flatter  since World  War  II than  it 
was earlier,  see Philip  Cagan,  "Changes  in the Recession  Behavior  of Wholesale  Prices  in 
the  1920's and Post-World War II," Explorations  in Economic  Research,  vol.  2 (Winter 
1975),  pp. 54-104; and Jeffrey Sachs, "The Changing  Cyclical  Behavior  of Wages and 
Prices: 1890-1976,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 70 (March  1980),  pp. 78-90. Any 
flattening  in the Phillips curve that may have occurred  during  the period of concern 
appears  to have been substantially  less pronounced. 
14. Inclusion  of the square  of the normalized  help-wanted  index  had  virtually  no effect 
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wage feedbacks, the added inflation  would be about twice this large. 
Moreover, in the table 6 equations  that include  both the inverse of the 
unemployment  rate  for  prime-age  males  and  the normalized  help-wanted 
index, only the latter  has a meaningful  effect on wage growth.  II 
The time-series  results  presented  in table  6 are  much  more  credible  in 
light of the cross-area  analyses  presented  above. Given the role of V in 
explaining  cross-area  differences  in wage growth, after controlling  for 
U, it makes  very good sense that  the marked  outward  shift  in the national 
Beveridge  curve around  1973  would  have caused some outward  shift in 
the Phillips  curve for the nation. Note that the cross-sectional and the 
time-series  wage-growth  equations  imply  a similar  effect of help-wanted 
advertising  on wage growth, and hence a similar shift in the Phillips 
curve, allowing  for the fact that equation  9 measures  wage growth  over 
a decade. Moreover,  across  regions  the main  determinant  of wage  growth 
appears  to be employers'  difficulty  in satisfying  their  labor  demands  and 
not the rate  of unemployment  for the area.  This  observation  gives cross- 
sectional support to the idea that in an augmented  Phillips equation 
including  both V and U, only V really  matters. 
IMPACT  ON  TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH: 
CROSS-REGION  EVIDENCE 
An important  analysis  of total  factor  productivity  growth  in manufac- 
turing  across U.S. regions has recently been completed  by Hulten and 
Schwab.16 In  their investigation of  the  1951-78 period they  used 
information  on value added and labor hours  from Census of Manufac- 
tures  and Annual  Survey  of  Manufactures  for  both  production  and 
nonproduction  workers and data from other sources on plant, equip- 
ment, inventories, and land. Each of the series used was deflated  with 
aggregate price data. In light of  some sharp recent movements in 
industrial  relative prices, I redeflated  their original  value-added  figures 
to reflect  each region's  two-digit  SIC industry  mix. 
Regional  data based on the Hulten and Schwab study are presented 
in table 7 for three periods: 1951-65, 1965-73, and 1973-78. The first 
15. For more evidence in support  of this result, see Medoff  and Abraham,  "Unem- 
ployment." 
16. See Charles  R. Hulten  and  Robert  M. Schwab,  "Regional  Productivity  Growth  in 
U.S. Manufacturing:  1951-78"  (Washington,  D.C.: The Urban  Institute,  1982). 0 
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three rows show average annual percentage changes in total factor 
productivity.  These figures  were derived  by subtracting  the product  of 
capital's share of value added and the growth rate of the capital-labor 
ratio  from the growth  rate in output  per labor  hour (given in the fourth 
through  sixth rows). The last three rows give the growth rates of paid 
labor  hours. 
Table 7 reveals some surprising  facts about regional productivity 
developments. If productivity growth has been dominated by new 
capital, implying better capital and hence higher productivity, or by 
faster output  growth,  implying  reduced  slack or unutilized  capacity  and 
hence higher  productivity,  then total factor productivity  growth  would 
have been faster in the expanding  Southwest and Pacific  areas than in 
the declining  Northeast  and Middle  Atlantic  regions. However, table 7 
indicates that the slowdown of total factor productivity  growth during 
the three periods  was at least as high  in the Southwest  and Pacific  areas 
as in the Northeast  and  Middle  Atlantic  regions. 
The results of table 7 are consistent with the idea that large  spurts  in 
labor demand are associated with high start-up  costs.  As discussed 
above, a rapid  increase in labor demand  is likely to be correlated  with 
sharp  growth in employers' difficulty  in securing  and retaining  desired 
work  forces; all else the same, this will be reflected  in lower total factor 
productivity  growth. 
A pooled time-series cross-sectional regression  of total factor pro- 
ductivity  data  on labor  hours, both from  table  7, yields 
(11)  tfp -  1.9 -  0.1091  -  1.19D73-78,  N  =  12;  R2 -  0.82, 
(0.16) (0.055)  (0.19) 
where  tfp =  annual  percentage  growth  in total factor productivity  in 
an area  in a given period  (mean, 1.2; standard  deviation, 
0.66) 
l=  annual percentage change in labor hours (mean, 1.2; 
standard  deviation, 1.8) 
D73-78=  dummy variable indicating  that the observation is for 
1973-78. 
The estimated  coefficient  of l in equation 11 indicates  that the faster 
that  manufacturers  in an area  were expanding  their  labor  input,  the lower 
was their total factor productivity  growth;  to be more specific, an area 114  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
with labor  growth  that was one standard  deviation  above the mean had 
total factor productivity  growth 16 percent  below average. Apparently 
the rapid  growth of labor in an area had strong  positive relations  with 
phenomena  that reduce  productivity-such as quits, discharges, short- 
ages, and  vacancies, as discussed above. 
To examine one of these relations,  the data  from  table 1 on vacancy 
rates  and skill shortages  were regressed  on the labor  hours  entry  of table 
7. For each of the six regions, VJ  (from  1970-72)  was explained  by labor- 
hours  growth, 1,  for 1965-73;  and Vs (from 1977)  was explained  by I for 
1973-78. The D73-78  dummy  was included  because VJ  and Vs are not in 
the same units. The results  were 
(12)  V =  0.57  +  0.041  -  0.02D73-78,  N  =  12;  R2  =  0.27. 
(0.07)  (0.02)  (0.08) 
Thus the job vacancy rate or skill shortage  indicator  in a region  was 
closely associated with the growth of labor input from 1965 to 1978; 
areas  with I  of one standard  deviation  above average  had V  of 12  percent 
above average. 
IMPACT  ON  TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY  GROWTH: 
NATIONAL  EVIDENCE 
Given the support  from the area analysis, the idea that employers' 
difficulty  in satisfying  their  labor  demands  adversely  affects total factor 
productivity  growth was applied  to aggregate  data. The variable  to be 
explained  was total factor productivity  growth  calculated  by the Amer- 
ican Productivity  Center  using government  statistics on output, hours, 
plant,  equipment,  land,  and  inventories.  The  growth  rate  of employment 
and  the new hires rate  within  manufacturing  were taken  as indicators  of 
employers' potential  problems  with their labor  input. The year-to-year 
difference in the logarithm  of the Federal Reserve Board's capacity 
utilization  rate  and  the prime-age  male unemployment  rate  were used to 
account  for cyclical effects on productivity. 
Equation  8-1 of table 8 shows that, after  controlling  for trend  factors 
and the rate of unemployment,  total factor productivity  growth in the 
manufacturing  sector was about 0.9 percentage  point lower starting  in 
1973.  Equation  8-2 adds the change  in the log of the capacity  utilization James  L. Medoff  115 
rate, which has a very significant  estimated  coefficient  of 0.6. Inclusion 
of the utilization  variable  reduces  in absolute  value  the coefficient  on the 
dummy  for 1973  and  later  from  0.9 to 0.7. 
Once cyclical and  trend  factors  have been allowed  for, the coefficient 
estimates  for equation  8-3 indicate  that  employment  growth  per se has a 
substantial  effect on total  factor  productivity  growth.  Adding  the change 
in the log of employment  variable  changes the dummy  for 1973  or later 
from - 0.7 to - 0.2. This decline in the unexplained  drop-off  in produc- 
tivity growth since 1973 reflects two facts about the manufacturing 
sector. First, after  controlling  for trend, unemployment,  and utilization 
changes, the faster growth  of employment  is associated with a slower 
growth  of total  factor  productivity,  as the  cross-sectional  results  suggest. 
Second, with the same factors held constant, there has been a sharp 
increase  in the growth  rate  of employment  in the years  from 1973  on. 
The  final  equation,  8-4,  in  table  8 includes  the new hires  rate,  which, all 
else the same, was much  higher  from 1973  to 1981  than  in the preceding 
twenty-five  years. Including  new hires data brings  the estimated  coeffi- 
cient of the dummy  for 1973  and later  to zero. The estimated  coefficient 
of the employment change variable is reduced in absolute value but 
retains  its negative  significant  effect on total  factor  productivity  growth. 
This result has two implications:  a higher  new hires rate means lower 
productivity  growth, presumably  because of increased  turnover,  train- 
ing, and so on; and other factors that reduce the productivity  growth 
associated  with employment  growth  are unrelated  to new hires, such as 
shortages  and  retraining. 
The cross-sectional and time-series  results are both consistent with 
the basic idea that the growth of the labor input involves important 
adjustment  costs. Hence the rapid  growth of labor input from 1973  to 
the end of the decade seems to have contributed  to the disappointing 
growth  of total  factor  productivity. 
Conclusions 
Imbalance  in U.S. labor markets  appears  to have grown markedly 
from 1973  onward. At a given rate of prime-age  male unemployment, 
employers  did much  more advertising  per employee to obtain  the work o  <-  r  '  8  - > 
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forces they needed after 1973  than before. Moreover, if one holds the 
unemployment  rate for prime-age  males constant, the probability  rose 
sharply  that  an employee, at least in the manufacturing  sector, would  be 
fired  or quit.  Thus  employers'  difficulty  in satisfying  their  labor  demands 
at a given level of unutilized  labor supply appears  to have increased 
substantially. 
This  potentially  important  development  was reflected  by the business 
press. Between 1972 and 1981, when the rate of unemployment  for 
prime-age males rose  from 3.1 to 5.4, the lines of print in business 
periodicals  discussing skill shortages  rose by a factor greater  than two 
(as  reflected  in  a review  of seventy-one  periodicals).  17 In 1981  the number 
of lines of business press discussing skill shortages  was almost double 
the annual average between 1965 and 1969, when the unemployment 
rate  for those workers  averaged  2.0 percent. 
What  factors caused this increase in labor  market  imbalance?  Here- 
tofore, most analysts  have emphasized  supply-side  structural  changes.  18 
To date, however, little attention  has been given to the fact that, since 
1973,  U.S. employment  growth, adjusted  for the cycle, has been much 
more  rapid  than  would  have been predicted  from  historical  trends.  It has 
been argued  here that this rapid  employment  growth added to the job 
vacancies, new hires,  and  quit  and  discharge  rates  with  which  employers 
were confronted. 
The extent of labor market imbalance  is important  in and of itself 
because it reflects the amount of unemployment  that is "structural." 
Results  developed  here  indicate  that  imbalance  in the 1970s  also contrib- 
uted to an outward  shift in the Phillips  curve for the United States and 
its cycle-corrected  rate of total factor  productivity  growth. As a result, 
for a given level of unemployment,  inflationary  pressure  was greater  and 
productivity  growth  was slower  than  they would  have been otherwise. 
On the basis of demographic  trends, labor  market  imbalance  should 
lessen in future years. The annual  growth  rate of the U.S. labor force 
is forecast to decline from 2.5 percent  in the 1970s  to 1.4 percent  in the 
1980s, and to 0.5 percent in the 1990s. Moreover, imbalance might 
become less of a problem  as the work  force matures,  with  the percentage 
17. For more detail on this analysis  of the business  press see James  L. Medoff  with 
the  assistance  of Jonathan  B. Wiener,  "Labor  Markets  in  Imbalance:  Review  of Qualitative 
Evidence"  (Harvard  University,  Department  of Economics, 1982). 
18. Lilien, "Sectoral  Shifts," is a notable  exception. 118  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
share of the population aged eighteen to twenty-four declining from 19 
percent to 14 percent between  1980 and 1990 and to about 12 percent by 
the year 2000. 
However,  there are many other important issues  that may affect the 
degree of imbalance. What are the ramifications of having a work force 
that has larger numbers of female and black workers than in the past? 
How will a technology  based on microprocessors,  robots, telecommuni- 
cations, computer services,  and other elements of electronic automation 
affect labor markets? What trade policies will be adopted by the United 
States and other countries? The operation of U.S.  labor markets in the 
future will also depend on the answers to these questions. 
APPENDIX  A 
States in Each Census Region 
Region  States 
Northeast  Connecticut,  Maine,  Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire,  New York, 
Rhode  Island,  Vermont 
Southeast  Alabama,  Arkansas,  Florida,  Georgia, 
Louisiana,  Mississippi,  North  Carolina, 
South  Carolina,  Tennessee 
Pacific  Alaska,  California,  Hawaii,  Oregon, 
Washington 
Middle  Atlantic  Delaware,  Maryland,  New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  West Virginia 
Midwest  Colorado,  Idaho,  Illinois,  Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,  Michigan, 
Minnesota,  Missouri,  Montana,  Nebraska, 
North  Dakota,  Ohio, Oklahoma, 
South  Dakota,  Wisconsin,  Wyoming 
Southwest  Arizona,  Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Utah James  L. Medoff  119 
APPENDIX  B 
Occupations  in Each of the Two  Major 
Job Categories 
Category  Occupation 
Maintenance,  tool room,  Auto mechanic  Pipefitter 
and  power  plant  Boiler  tender  Power  truck  operator 
Carpenter  Receiver 
Electrician  Sheet metal  worker 
Forklift  operator  Shipper 
Guard  Shipper  and  receiver 
Janitor  (male;  female)  Shipping  packer  (male; 
Machine  tool operator  female) 
Machinist  Stationary  engineer 
Material  laborer  Tool and  die worker 
Mechanic  Tractor  trailer  driver 
Millwright  Trades  helper 
Order  filler  Truck  driver:  heavy 
Painter  Truck  driver:  light 
Truck  driver:  medium 
Office  and  clerical  Accounting  clerk  I  Order  clerk 
(male;  female)  Payroll  clerk 
Accounting  clerk  II  Secretary 
(male;  female)  Stenographer:  general 
Bookkeeping  machine  Stenographer:  senior 
operator  I (male;  and  technical 
female)  Switchboard  operator 
Bookkeeping  machine  Switchboard  operator: 
operator  II (male;  receptionist 
female)  Transcribing  machine 
File clerk  I  operator 
File clerk  II  Typist  I 
File clerk  III  Typist  II 120  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
APPENDIX  C 
Standard  Metropolitan  Statistical  Areas (SMSAs) 
in Each State 
State  SMSA 
California  Los Angeles, San Francisco 
Colorado  Denver 
Florida  Jacksonville,  Miami 
Georgia  Atlanta 
Illinois  Chicago 
Indiana  Indianapolis 
Kentucky  Louisville 
Louisiana  New Orleans 
Maryland  Baltimore 
Massachusetts  Boston 
Michigan  Detroit 
Minnesota  Minneapolis 
Missouri  Kansas  City, St. Louis 
Nebraska  Omaha 
New Jersey  Newark 
New York  Albany,  New York 
Ohio  Cincinnati,  Cleveland,  Columbus,  Dayton,  Toledo 
Oklahoma  Oklahoma  City 
Pennsylvania  Philadelphia,  Pittsburgh 
Rhode  Island  Providence 
Tennessee  Memphis 
Texas  Dallas, Houston, San Antonio 
Utah  Salt Lake City 
Virginia  Richmond 
Washington  Seattle 
Wisconsin  Milwaukee Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: Medoff  presents an impressive  array  of evidence that 
unemployment  is much  higher  now  for  given  values  of other  labor  market 
indicators,  in comparison  to the situation  in the 1960s  and earlier. His 
interpretation  of the disagreement  among  the indicators  stresses the idea 
of imbalance.  According to Medoff, the labor market  has been called 
upon  to match  a larger  flow of new and  displaced  workers  in the past ten 
years than it was before. His evidence is that help-wanted  advertising 
has been indicating  tight markets despite rising unemployment;  dis- 
charges have indicated  moderate  conditions when unemployment  has 
been high in the past few years; quits have been high even with high 
unemployment  (historically, quits have been associated with strong 
labor markets); and wage inflation advanced during the 1970s even 
though  unemployment  was high. 
Other  research has confirmed  the divergence  between measures of 
conditions  in  the labor  market.  The  paper  by Gary  Burtless  in  this  volume 
shows that unemployment  has grown tremendously  relative to claims 
for unemployment  insurance. George Akerlof and Janet Yellen have 
found that unemployment  as officially  measured  has risen dramatically 
relative to the annual retrospective measure of unemployment  in the 
March  survey  of the work  experience  of the  population.  Charles  Schultze 
showed in a report  in the BPEA in 1971  that layoffs were unusually  low 
relative to unemployment,  a trend that became much more prominent 
later  in the 1970s.  Finally, my own work  on the tenure  of the work  force 
has shown that the basic turnover rate in the labor force has been 
constant  over the past few decades despite  rising  unemployment. 
One thread  runs through  all this work. The divergence  is not among 
labor  market  indicators  in general. Rather,  the unemployment  rate has 
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been signaling  much slacker markets  than all the other indicators.  It is 
worth  thinking  about  a hypothesis  for explaining  the findings  of Medoff 
and others that does not stress imbalance, but rather the changing 
problem of measuring  unemployment.  Could it be that an important 
source  of divergence  is simply  that  our  method  for measuring  unemploy- 
ment  picks up a larger  fraction  of the population  as unemployed  than it 
did  in earlier  decades?  I should  mention  that  none of the evidence I have 
cited comes from Barro, Kochin, or others who want to prove that 
recessions are a figment  of Keynesian  imagination. 
I see some confirming  evidence that  much  of what  Medoff  reports  can 
be traced to  changes in the population that make the measure of 
unemployment  from the Current  Population  Survey (CPS)  rise relative 
to the amount  of joblessness. 
The basic technique in the CPS for measuring  unemployment  is to 
ask someone in the household  two key questions  about  each adult.  The 
first  question is "What  did X do most of last week?" Possible answers 
include  worked,  looked  for  work, kept  house, was on layoff,  was retired, 
and was in school. The other question, raised only for people who did 
not work  at all last week, is "Did X do anything  to try to find  work  in the 
past four  weeks?" 
As it actually works, only the second question matters. With a 
handful  of exceptions, everyone who has done anything  in the past four 
weeks to  look for work is  counted as unemployed. What is most 
remarkable  is that only half the people who are eventually counted as 
unemployed  are reported  as looking  for work or on layoff in the week 
before the survey. The others are keeping  house, retired,  in school, or 
ill. All these categories have probably  contributed  to the upsurge in 
unemployment  as measured  by the CPS in the following ways. Fewer 
people  are keeping  house, but  those who are  keeping  house are  probably 
more likely to consider the possibility  of looking  into a job in any four- 
week period. The fraction  of the population  that is retired  has skyrock- 
eted, mainly  because of decreasing  mortality  rates. Many  of the retired, 
especially those under age sixty-five, are sufficiently  interested  in the 
possibility of working  that they will look into a job at least once every 
four weeks. The fraction  of young  adults  in school has grown  manyfold 
in the past two decades. Unemployment  has particularly  increased  for 
this age group. Young adults in school are especially likely to consider 
working during the periods when they are not in fact working. The James  L. Medoff  123 
fraction  of the population  that  is not working  because of poor health  has 
grown,  especially  among  older  people. This  group  contains  many  people 
who look into work  at least once every four  weeks. 
More  generally,  what  has happened  to the U.S. population  in the past 
few decades has put a much larger  fraction of the population  on the 
economic margin  between working  and  not working.  Consequently,  the 
fraction  of the population  that is not working  at one moment, but has 
looked for work in the past few weeks, has grown.  The measurement  of 
unemployment  in the CPI has picked up this trend. Other  measures  of 
conditions  in the labor  market  have not been affected. 
What should one conclude if it is indeed true that Medoff's findings 
say more about the technical issue of measuring  unemployment  than 
they do about labor market  imbalance?  First, CPS unemployment  as 
measured  is an interesting  number  and  analysts  should  continue  to look 
at it. It is worth knowing  what fraction  of the population  is looking  for 
work, even if some of the job-seeking activity is not the result of 
joblessness as it is normally  conceived. Second, it is important  to be 
aware that unemployment  has diverged  from every other labor market 
indicator.  One should  be cautious about  recommending  macro  policies 
that  focus on the CPS unemployment  rate without  being aware  of what 
that rate measures. Third, as far as diagnosing  the tone of the labor 
market  for predicting  wage inflation  and the like, we can do a lot better 
than  the CPS unemployment  rate. Medoff  amply  documents  the superi- 
ority of other labor market  indicators  in this respect. Fourth, as far as 
diagnosing hardship, the important changes that have occurred in 
American life should be kept in mind, such as better medical care, 
equality  of roles and opportunities  for women and men, and higher  real 
incomes. Some of the signals from the CPS unemployment  rate are 
telling  us about  these changes,  not aboutjoblessness.  Of  course, cyclical 
changes  in  CPS  unemployment  are  dominated  byjoblessness-the  forces 
I have been discussing  operate  slowly over decades, not in single  years. 
All labor market  indicators,  the CPS unemployment  rate among  them, 
are in agreement  that the past few years have been a period  of extraor- 
dinarily  poor conditions  for  job seekers in the labor  market. 
Robert M. Solow: The belief that there is more "structural  unemploy- 
ment" than  there used to be-or  that there  will soon be more structural 
unemployment  than there is now-is  a hardy perennial. It surfaces 124  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
without fail every time there is a stretch of high unemployment.  The 
belief has several distinct sources, which no doubt  explains  why it is so 
popular:  naive  people of good will  who simply  cannot  see unemployment 
as reflecting anything more complex than the characteristics  of the 
unemployed;  apocalyptic people who like to think that the economic 
system as we know it has exhausted  its adaptive  power and requires,  at 
last, some fundamental  reform;  conservative  people who really do not 
care much  about  unemployment  but want to resist the tendency  toward 
expansionary  policy activism  that  prolonged  unemployment  might  bring. 
All convex combinations  of these three possibilities are conceivable. 
There  is also a fourth:  it might  be true.  The  fact that, so far,  the structural 
unemployment  argument  has proved false time after time does not 
foreclose a future  success. There  is nothing  illogical  about  the idea: the 
adaptive  capacity  of the economy is not unlimited,  and  there  might  come 
shocks to demand  or supply to which it could adjust  only very slowly, 
or only with drastic  changes in relative  prices and relative  incomes, so 
drastic  as to be intolerable  by many. 
It is clear  that  Medoff  does not fall into  any of the first  three  categories 
I mentioned. I thought  the paper presented an interesting  argument- 
suggesting  a modest increase in structural  unemployment  in the 1970s, 
probably reversible in due course. The two findings I would like to 
discuss are, first, that the Beveridge  curve for the United States shifted 
outward  during  the early part of the decade, perhaps  to the tune of a 
couple of percentage points of prime-age male unemployment;  and 
second, that  the vacancy  rate,  or  the best available  proxy  for  the vacancy 
rate, is a better measure of labor-market  pressure  than the unemploy- 
ment  rate  for use in Phillips-curve  estimation. 
One inevitable weakness of the paper is the necessity to use the 
normalized help-wanted index as a surrogate  for the vacancy rate. 
Medoff had no choice, of course. I think  he was quite right  to do as he 
did. It is a slight weakness, nevertheless, because his scatter  diagrams 
seem to show a discrete shift of the Beveridge  curve sometime  around 
1973, rather than a slow back-and-forth  movement along a higher- 
dimensional surface. Then there is always the danger, as Medoff is 
perfectly  aware,  that  this  apparent  shift  reflects  something  that  happened 
to the relation between the help-wanted  index and the vacancy rate 
rather than between the vacancy rate and the unemployment  rate. 
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inflation  between the 1960s and the 1970s across different  regions is 
explained by the change in the help-wanted  index across the regions, 
does indicate  that  there  is something  to the time-series  regressions.  But 
I would feel more comfortable  if he had made  a more determined  effort 
to purify the help-wanted  index of other influences that might have 
caused  it to move to a higher  level at about  that  time. Some  of the  obvious 
possibilities are: a drop in the relative price of newspaper  advertising; 
the shift toward female employment, which might lead to more help- 
wanted  advertising  because women are less clued in to the informal  job 
network;  the shift toward  service occupations, computer-type  occupa- 
tions, and perhaps other things. It is possible that there are regional 
differences in help-wanted advertising, so that the regional shift in 
employment  discussed by Medoff could have something  to do with it. 
If, as this paper  strongly  suggests, the help-wanted  index  is a very useful 
indicator  of labor-market  conditions,  that  is all the more  reason  why we 
should  want  to understand  it as thoroughly  as we can. 
It occurred to me when reading this paper that it would be very 
interesting  to see what has happened  to the Beveridge curve in other 
industrial  countries during  the same interval  of time. This would have 
two advantages.  First, some countries  do have vacancy statistics, so the 
detour through  the help-wanted  index can be avoided. (By the way, 
Canada  appears to have both some vacancy data and a help-wanted 
index, so one might  be able to learn  something  about  their  interconnec- 
tion.) Second, international  differences  in the behavior  of the Beveridge 
curve might suggest explanations  of the forces moving it where it has 
moved. I dug  a few figures  out of the OECD's  Main Economic Indicators 
and  then discovered  that my colleague  Katherine  Abraham  had  already 
been looking  into the question, so she was able to help. Here is a crude 
impression.  The Beveridge curve does appear  to have shifted  outward 
in the early 1970s in Canada,  Japan, France, Finland, and the United 
Kingdom,  but  not in Germany  or the Netherlands.  There  are some cases 
that  are  not so easy to classify. I would  guess that  there  has been no shift 
in Sweden, but there probably  has been one in Norway. Australia  and 
Belgium  are also moot: more likely yes for Australia,  perhaps  also for 
Belgium.  For all these countries  I presume  the unemployment  rate  is the 
total rate, which might  make a small  difference.  Anyway, I think  there 
is an interesting  research  project  here. For  instance,  it may  be significant 
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regional  shifts  to be very important,  experienced  no shift  in one case and 
a small  one at best in the other. (But  it occurs to me that  I may  be naive; 
religious and linguistic differences could make even small countries 
exhibit strong regional  effects.) West Germany,  however, is certainly 
regionalized,  but its Beveridge curve has been quite stable. I wonder 
whether employment  has grown more uniformly  across regions there 
than in the United States or other countries. Besides, I take it that 
Medoff's emphasis on uneven growth of employment  across regions 
could easily be converted into differences  across industries  if the data 
were cut that  way. These things  are certainly  worth  looking  into. 
I have one or two comments to make on the use of the help-wanted 
index in the estimation  of Phillips  curves. There  is nothing  counterintui- 
tive in the notion that V is a better variable  than U in wage equations. 
We tend to think  of U -  V as a measure  of the excess supply  of labor, 
which would suggest that both variables  would contribute  statistically. 
But there is nothing  shocking  in the notion that the threat  to employed 
workers-especially  those with seniority, communicated  by a high un- 
employment  rate-might be fairly  weak, whereas  an employer  who was 
trying  to fill  vacancies might  be tempted  to bid  aggressively  for workers, 
especially if there were a chance of creaming  better trained  or more 
experienced workers from nearby firms. It will take more experience 
with using vacancy rates and  proxies for them  as independent  variables 
before we will know best how to handle  this. The work of Medoff and 
Abraham  is certainly  an important  contribution. 
I revert  to the general  structural-unemployment  argument  for a con- 
cluding  remark.  I have a notion that ordinary  cyclical unemployment, 
if it is prolonged,  can transform  itself into structural  unemployment.  An 
economy that remains  for too long at the high-unemployment  end of its 
Beveridge  curve may find  the curve shifting  adversely.  The sort of thing 
I have in mind  is that anyone who has been out of work for a long time 
loses touch with the informal  job network, so the degree of friction in 
the labor market  increases. It may also be that skills deteriorate  with 
disuse just enough to make a visible difference  in the match between 
jobs and unemployed  workers  when the demand  for labor  revives. I am 
not suggesting  that  this sort of thing-if  it is real, which  I do not know- 
is what happened  in the United States during  Medoff's sample  period. 
In fact, in his figure 1 the beginnings  of the adverse shift seem to occur 
in 1971-73,  when  the unemployment  rate  was not so very  high.  However, James  L. Medoff  127 
the Beveridge  curve worsened  more  drastically  after 1975  (suspiciously 
mirroring  the 1958-59 track) when the unemployment  rate was very 
high. It is possible that there is less here than meets the eye; but I hope 
this interesting  paper  is the start  of a research  program  and  not the finish. 
General Discussion 
Martin  Neil Baily observed that a vacancy rate should  be thought  of 
as measuring  a different  dimension  of tightness  in the labor  market  from 
the unemployment  rate. The unemployment  rate describes the level of 
tightness in the labor market  while the vacancy rate (or its proxy, the 
help-wanted  index)  is related  to the rate  at which  jobs are  expanding  and 
hence describes  the change  in labor  market  tightness.  After  a prolonged 
period of slack, the two might appear  to be sending  out contradictory 
signals  if the labor  market  tightens  but still retains  a great  deal of slack. 
Baily also reported  that  there  was an increased  dispersion  of unemploy- 
ment rates across geographic  regions in the 1970s  in comparison  to the 
1960s, paralleling  Medoff's finding  of greater  vacancy dispersion. But 
he could find  no evidence that  higher  structural  unemployment  was due 
to industrial  shifts. 
Several  discussants  questioned  the reliability  of the help-wanted  data 
used in the paper.  Thomas  Juster  argued  that  only a small  fraction  ofjob 
openings is formally  advertised, which makes the connection between 
help-wanted ads and true vacancies highly uncertain and possibly 
unstable  over time. Albert  Rees observed that his own research  on the 
Chicago labor market with George Shultz showed that jobs for blue- 
collar  workers  are especially underrepresented  in the help-wanted  ads. 
Thus  the trend  in the help-wanted  index  might  be biased  upward  relative 
to the trend  in total vacancies because the ratio  of blue-collar  to white- 
collar job openings has declined over time. He also noted that the 
turnover data for manufacturing  represent a declining fraction of all 
workers  as the share  of manufacturing  in total  employment  declines  over 
time. William  Nordhaus  suggested  that equal employment  opportunity 
legislation may have contributed  to a rise in help-wanted  advertising 
relative  to true  vacancies as employers  sought  to demonstrate  that  their 
hiring  methods  were nondiscriminatory.  Steven Braun  reported  that  the 
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Conference  Board  calculated  help-wanted  ads declined  from 134  in 1960 
to 117  in 1970  and to 105  in 1980. Because the Conference  Board does 
not adjust  for it, the demise  of competitive  papers  might  bias upward  the 
help-wanted  index as more  advertising  went to the surviving  papers. 
Medoff responded that the cross-sectional results from the help- 
wanted  index supported  the usefulness of the index in explaining  wage 
changes. Although  the time series could  be subject  to some of the biases 
mentioned,  these should  not affect  the results  that  depend  on the relative 
change  in advertising  across geographic  regions. 
Alan Blinder took issue with Medoff's view that Beveridge curve 
movements  occurred  as surges  around  1973.  He thought  figures  1  through 
3 show a movement  in the relation  of unemployment  and  other  measures 
of conditions in the labor market  between the late 1960s  and the mid- 
1970s,  but not a sudden  shift in 1973.  Similarly,  Blinder  believed table 3 
shows a movement  in  jobs from  the Snow Belt to the Sun Belt over the 
entire 1950-80  period, not a discontinuous  shift  in the 1970s. 
Jeffrey Shafer endorsed Medoff's use of several measures  to gauge 
tightness in the labor market  and the use of Beveridge curves, rather 
than unemployment alone, as a useful way to summarize  changing 
conditions in the labor market. He noted that all the large Western 
European countries except Germany experienced the same kind of 
Beveridge curve shift observed in the United States. This common 
development  supports  Medoff s interpretation  that the explanation  for 
the U.S. shift is not to be found  in the geographic  concentration  of U.S. 
employment  growth. 
Lawrence Summers noted that the paper did not really provide a 
satisfactory  explanation  for  the  differing  patterns  of regional  employment 
growth  during  the 1970s.  One possible explanation  involves the pattern 
of demand  for the products of different  regions. An alternative  expla- 
nation would emphasize increasing wage rigidity. This is  certainly 
suggested  by the sharp  relative  increase  in union  wages observed  during 
the decade. More generally,  the problems  of explaining  regional  differ- 
ences in labor  market  behavior  are worthy  of further  research. 